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'• IN THE SUP·REME CO,URT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
rrlll~: p .\ HK .. \XD RECI-n~~ .. \ TIOX I 
CO\DI INSIO~ OF THE 
ST.\TE OF UTAH, 
p f G·i II fi If- /t I' ,O...'JI n II f /('I If ~ 
-\'S.-
IH:P.\Hrr~II~:XT OF FIN.AXCE O:B-, 
rriii~: STATE OF UTAH, 
l>Pfnul aut-A p }Jell auf. I 
Case 
Ko.10010 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
.\ ppellant 's statement as to the nature of the case is 
accurate, but there is more involved than a strict applica-
tion of monetar~- figures. The real question is whether 
~vdion 63-11-l~l..:\ should be strictly, narrowly and rigidly 
l'illl~trued without regard to legislatiYe intent, thereby 
perpetuating a legislatin' error, or ·whether it should be 
liberally and fairly construed, thus giving effect to the 
h~~isla ti,·e intent. 
The Legislature in 1963 intended to amend the 1961 
Pnactrnent of Section 63-11-19A so as to increase the 
anthorization for \Yasatch ~Ionntain State Park land 
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purchase contracts by the sum of $150,000.00, thereby 
increasing the 1961 authorization of $1,173,648.57 to a 
total of $1,323,648.57. But the Legislature erroneously 
amended the 1961 act to show a total authorization of 
$150,000.00, seeming to be a decrease of $1,023,648.57, 
rather than· an increase of $150,000.00. 
Thus, the nature of the case is a judicial determina-
tion of whether the present Section 63-11-19A means 
$150,000.00 as it was erroneously and inadvertently en-
acted, or whether it means $1,323,648.57 as the Legisla-
ture intended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial judge, considering the questions of law 
pursuant to a stipulation of facts and upon respondent's 
motion for summary judgment, ruled that Section 
63-11-19A authorized the sum of $1,323,648.57 for Wa-
satch ::\fountain State Park land acquisition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not dispute the facts recited in ap-
pellant's brief. It might be helpful, however, to supple-
ment that statement of facts with a more complete 
explanation of what happened in the enactment of the 
1963 statute. 
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Dwight Freeman, assistant director of the Park and 
Recreation Commission, who had been in charge of "\Ya-
sntch Jlonntain State Park development from its incep-
tion to tlw time of the hea.ring in the lower court (T. 6), 
was called and testified. He explained that the Commis-
sion had under option land which it wanted to acquire 
for addition to the park, but that the dollar volume would 
£lX<'t-ed the 1961 authorization, and it was thereupon de-
termin<:'d to request the Legislature to authorize an addi-
tional $202,000.00 in land acquisition contracts (T. 6-8). 
~I r. Freeman explained that Senate Bill No. 218 (Ex. 
P-:n was introduced to accomplish such purpose, and that 
he appeared hefore the Senate, sitting as committee of 
the whol<:', and used maps to indicate the specific acreage 
held under option and which would be acquired if the 
additio11al authorization were granted (T. 9). The bill 
passed the Senate, but in the House Rep. Robert F. Clyde 
from Heber City objected to the purchase of a particu-
lar piece of property held under option and succeeded in 
amending the bill down from $202,000.00 to $150,000.00 
(Ex. P-1, T. 9-11). The property in question belonged 
to Alfred Lippold and was held under option for 
<):2,000.00, which accounted for the difference behveen 
the $202,000.00 as requested and the $150,000.00 as grant-
ed (T. 10). Rep. Clyde informed ilir. Freeman that he 
objected to purchase of the Lippold property under 
options: 
Q. Did "Jir. Clyde tell you in advance of the 
amendment, that he objected to acquisition of 
the Lippold property? 
..:\. Yes. 
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Q. Did he tell you that he thought that the addi-
tional acquisition should be limited to those 
acquisitions which should (sic) (could) be 
acquired for $150,000.00 ~ 
A. That is true. (T. 11) 
Exhibit P-1, which is an extract of page 733 from the 
official House of Representatives Journal (Day 59), con-
tains the following: 
''On motion of Representative Clyde, the rules 
were suspended, and S. B. No. 218 was read the 
second and third time and placed on its final 
passage. 
On motion of Representative Clyde, the bill was 
amended as follows : 
Page 1, line 9, delete '202,000.00' and insert 
'150,000'. 
Purpose of this amendment is to delete the 
purchase by the State Park and Recreation 
Commission of the Lippold property which 
comprises an area of approximately 1,420 
acres.'' 
The bill was thus amended down from $202,000.00 to 
$150,000.00 to authorize exercising options on additional 
land for the lesser sum. 
Another fact which shows that the 1963 Legislature 
was interested in promoting, rather than restricting, the 
park is the fact that a bill was passed authorizing the 
issuance and sale of revenue bonds to construct an aerial 
tramway on land already being acquired by the Commis-
sion pursuant to the contracts authorized by the 1961 
net. The 1963 aerial tram\vay bill was enacted into la-w 
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nnd ('O(lified as Chapter 11, Title 63, Utah Code Anno-
tnh·d. 
Thus, t itP error is obvious. The Legislature could 
han· i1H'n•a:-;pd the authorization by enacting a separate 
:-;tatntP authorizing $150,000.00, or it could have increased 
the l~Hil amount by $150,000.00. Rather than follow 
(lither such procedure, however, it amended the 1961 act 
hy dt~lt~ting that authorization of $1,173,648.57 and in-
serting $150,000.00. So, all that exists now by way of 
~tatntory authorization is the 1963 amendment to Sec-
tion 63-11-19A reciting the figure of $150,000.00 rather 
than the intended combined total of $1,323,648.57. 
It seems to be an incredible error. But error it 1s . 
. \t the same time the Legislature was passing the appro-
priations ad to appropriate money to pay current in-
stallments on the 1961 contract authorization and to 
permit exercise of options pursuant to the 1963 increase 
(.\.ppropriations Act of 1963, Item 126 on page 26), and 
at the same time it was passing the aerial tramway bill 
to permit the sale of revenue bonds to build a substan-
tial recreational facility, it was also enacting into lavY an 
error that cast shadows of doubt on existing contracts, 
on existing options and on the validity of any revenue 
bond issue to build a facility on land which there seemed 
t() be no authorization to buy. For this reason this de-
claratory judgment proceeding became necessary. 
~-\RGU~IEXT 
THE J"CDG~IEXT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
SHOrLD BE .AFFIR~IED. 
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A. The Legislative Error Is Obrious 
It is undisputed and indisputable that the LC'gisla-
ture in the 1963 act intended to authorize responde11t 
Park and Recreation Commission to contract for the 
purchase of land in the principal amount of $150,000.00 
in addition to the 1961 authorization of $1,173,648.37. 
The only question is whether the lower court was correct 
in giving effect to the legislative intent by holding that 
the present Section 63-11-19A authorizes the principal 
amount of $1,323,648.57 rather than the stated principal 
amount of $150,000.00. 
B. The Statute Should Be Liherally and 
Fairly Construed 
Few things could be clearer than this (\nut's con-
sistent and perceptive practice of construing statntes so 
as to make them meaningful and effective in accompli:-11-
ing the legislative intent. The cases are numerous, and 
the principle is so firmly established that the citation of 
authorities seems superfluous. As recently as Smifli Y. 
Smith, ______ Utah 2d ______ , 386 P. 2d 900 (decided November 
20, 1963), 1\Ir. Justice Crockett summarized many of the 
cases illustrating the rule of liberal construction of stat-
utes, and quoted from .lulw.nson Y. Cudahy Packing Com-
1Jany, 107 Utah 114, 132 P. 2d 98: 
'' R:- so holding we are cognizant of the fact th:1t 
\Ye are not following the literal wording of the 
statute, but such is not required when to do so 
would defeat legislatiYe intent and make the stat-
ute absurd." 
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.\reoRD: Hubimwn v. [] uiun Pacif'i(' R. Co., 70 Utah 441, 
~fit P. 9; B·rai:kett v. Chamberlain, 115 ~[e. 335, 98 . :\. 933; 
Xichnls v. Logatn, 184 Ky. 711, 213 S.W. 181; Rogers v. 
JVagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P. 2d 766; Ron·lcy r. Public 
St·rri<'t' Commission, 115 Utah 116, 185 P. 2d 514; Peay 
v. Board of Educafiou, 1-1: Utah 2d 63,377 P. 2d490; State 
, .. Bassett, 14 Utah 2d 412, 385 P. 2d 334 (October 1, 
t!Hi:q: Sutherla-nd, Statutory Construction., 3rd Ed., Vol. 
:1, Section 5501, 6007; Anwricwn Jurisprudence, Statutes, 
Vol. 50, Sections 230, 240, 386. 
In Smith v. Smith, above cited, Justice Crockett 
stated that "the universally recognized doctrine" was 
well PX}H'l'Ssed in N or~·ill e v. State Tax Com11tission, 98 
rtah 170, 97 P. 2d 937, 126 ALR 1318: 
''In the exposition of a statute the intention ... 
will prevail over the literal sense of the term; 
and its reason and intention will prevail over the 
st rid letter." 
Since the intent of the Legislature is clear, the stat-
ute should be construed to give effect to such intent. 
C. The Literal W ordin.g of the Statute Would 
Produce Harsh Results 
If this Court were to limit Wasatch 11ountain State 
Park land purehase contracts to the principal amount of 
~150,000.00, as stated in the statute, no further payments 
could be made on existing contracts and the State would 
default and lose the equitable interest it now has 
acquired; and present options could not be exercised and 
much of such land could not later be acquired. The entire 
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\Vasatch :Thfountain State Park program would collapse 
and the State would lose hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars which it has already invested. 
D. The Literal Wording of the Statute Is 
Cncon,stit utional 
A literal limit of $150,000.00 on the total principal 
amount of land purchase contract for Wasatch l\Iountain 
State Park would violate both the federal and state con-
stitutions. This is so because the 1961 act authorized con-
tracts in the amount of $1,173,648.57, allowed the sellers 
to assign their contract interests, and made such con-
tracts incontestable in the hands of good faith purchasers 
for value. The full faith and credit of the State \Ya~ 
expressly pledged in support of such contract obligations. 
In reliance upon this statute, contracts totalling $1,151,-
663.38 were entered into, and the First Security Bank as 
a good faith purchaser for value has acquired :Jl;,)7~-.)l;).~;) 
of that amount (T. 7, 8). 
Thus, to attempt to reduce the total principal au-
thorization to a mere $150,000.00, after the above con-
tract rights had vested, "\vould be an unconstitutimwl 
legislative attempt to impair the obligation of contracts 
in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution d 
the United States and in violation of Article I, Section 18 
of the Constitution of Utah. 
As to sub-points C and D, it is emphasized that the 
Legislature did not intend to reduce the 1961 authoriza-
tion, but, arguendo, even if it had so intended, the stat-
ute would have been harsh, absurd and unconstitutional. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Section 63-ll-19A 
should be construed to authorize land acquisition con-
tracts for Wasatch :Mountain State Park in a total prin-
ripal amount not to exceed $1,323,648.57, as the Legisla-
ture intended, and that the judgment of the lower court be 
thus affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
